) renovation of Maslow's (1943b) hierarchy of needs makes a great contribution by basing human needs on the strong theoretical and empirical foundation of evolutionary biology and psychology. In addition, Kenrick et al. consider human needs at three different levels: evolutionary function, ontogenetic development, and proximate inputs. Neither Maslow's hierarchy nor previous lists of human needs by Murray (1938) and instincts by McDougall (1908 McDougall ( /1921 had such strong empirical justification and broad theoretical foundation.
However, because Kenrick et al. have based their analyses on an evolutionary perspective that is not attuned to unique aspects of human evolution, their theory of motivation is animalcentric rather than anthropocentric. Maslow (1943a) presented 13 propositions for a theory of human motivation, one of which was ''motivation theory must be anthropocentric rather than animalcentric'' (p. 89). Maslow intended to build a theory of human motivation, not a theory of animal motivation. The point of departure for his theory was that most psychological theories of motivation at that time were too heavily influenced by animal experiments on drives and instincts (see Seward, 1939 , for an earlier review of motivation theories). Although these early theories were empirically sound, they focused on hunger and sex drives, leading Maslow to criticize them for capturing only part of human motivation.
Kenrick et al.'s theory is remarkable for its generalizability, but by removing the need for self-actualization and treating human uniqueness as an afterthought, they also dispensed with the human pillar of Maslow's pyramid. Their ''new'' theory feels strangely old to us, for it is reminiscent of the animalcentered theories of motivation popular in the 1930s and 1940s, albeit with much stronger foundations. In one sense, this new theory takes us back to McDougall's (1908 McDougall's ( /1921 very evolutionarily minded instinct theory. Although this is not a negative move in and of itself, the renovated pyramid is not true to the original architect's spirit, and we believe this to be a drawback.
The Case for a Higher Order Human Need
To address the limitations of earlier theories of motivation, Maslow (1943b) postulated the need for self-actualization as a uniquely human motivation. He described it as follows:
Even if all these needs are satisfied, we may still often (if not always) expect that a new discontent and restlessness will soon develop, unless the individual is doing what he is fitted for. A musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet must write, if he is to be ultimately happy. What a man can be, he must be. This need we may call self-actualization. (p. 382) Maslow's description of self-actualization is reminiscent of Aristotle's (350 BCE/1985) concept of eudaimonia, which is often translated as happiness, a well-lived life, and flourishing. Aristotle proposed the concept of eudaimonia in an attempt to understand what is truly and uniquely human (Thomson, 1953) . If the goal of theorizing and research on motivation is to gain insights into human nature, stripping off the very things that make humans uniquely human seems unadvised.
Both Maslow (1943b) and Murray (1938) based their need theories on the types of goals humans pursue, as opposed to animal drives and instincts. When Maslow created his hierarchy of needs, he intended the higher needs to capture higher order goals. According to Maslow, the ultimate goal was self-actualization. In Kenrick et al.'s revised hierarchy of needs, parenting is now at the top of the hierarchy. Some researchers have argued against the idea of parenting as an innate human need, in light of findings that some people voluntarily forgo parenthood and that couples without children are no less happy (and are possibly even happier) than couples with children at home (see Baumeister, 1991; Stevenson & Wolfers, in press; Veenhoven, 1974) . Given the unreliability of birth control methods until very recently in human evolution, it is possible that the need for sex, not a need for parenting, ensured human procreation. Even if we leave the question of an innate parenting need aside, adopting Kenrick et al.'s developmental perspective in which parenting needs come after mating needs are met, it seems appropriate to us to go one step further. Erik Erikson postulated the life task of generativity (Erikson, Erikson, & Kivnick, 1986) , which is strongly associated with parenting and caring for children and grandchildren, arising after the life tasks of identity formation and the establishment of intimacy. After the life task of generativity, however, he postulated the life task of achieving wisdom: Parenting was not the final need to be fulfilled in this anthropocentric theory of life span development. Erikson's theory was based on his clinical observations, but since his time, the prominent life span psychologist Paul Baltes and his colleagues have conducted numerous empirical studies on wisdom, demonstrating that wisdom is an integral part of optimal human development (for reviews, see Baltes & Smith, 2008; Baltes & Staudinger, 2000) .
Besides the need for wisdom, the need for meaning is another candidate for an ultimate human need (Baumeister, 1991) . Meaning in life is a significant predictor of happiness (Emmons, 2003; Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006) , and loss of meaning in life is related to depression and suicide (Wang, Lightsey, Pietruszka, Uruk, & Wells, 2007; Wong & Fry, 1998) . The human need for meaning can't simply be reduced to needs for belonging, status, or mating. A person may have high status and a mate but still suffer from a lack of meaning in life. Nor is the need for meaning tantamount to a need for belonging with other people. Meaning is derived from a sense of embeddedness, belonging, and relatedness (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002) . People often find meaning in groups they belong to or their personal relationships, but people also derive meaning from being embedded in cultural meaning systems such as art, religion, or scholarly pursuits. These cultural webs of meaning consist of not only communities, but also valued ways of being, knowing, and doing. For these reasons, it seems reasonable to postulate the need for wisdom or meaning-if not the need for self-actualization, the cultural generalizibility of which is suspect (Baumeister, 1986; Nevis, 1983) -at the top of the hierarchy of human needs.
Culture Should Be a Central Ingredient of a Theory of Human Needs
A major advantage of postulating a higher order need at the top of the needs hierarchy is that a need such as wisdom or meaning is broad enough to allow for individual and cultural variations in specific pathways and contents. Human reality is full of individual and cultural variations, and a theory of human needs should capture this complexity. The postulation of a broad, high-order need at the top of the hierarchy provides theoretical flexibility, which we consider a strength rather than a weakness, as it allows the leeway to accommodate the complexities of individual and cultural variation.
Both Maslow (1943b) and Kenrick et al. seem to assume that a universal theory of motivation would be more sound than a theory that allows for individual and cultural variations. This, we believe, is because both Maslow and Kenrick et al. underestimate the power of culture in their theorizing of human motivation. Culture is implicated in human needs in multiple ways, and its exclusion weakens a theory of human motivation. For instance, meaning is culturally constructed on innate human foundations. People derive meaning from their cultures (Bruner, 1991; Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006) . Connections to cultural systems such as art, science, religion, or one's nation give the lives of many people meaning and purpose. Both meaning and wisdom are closely connected to values, and although there is much commonality, different cultures also specialize in different human values (Schwartz, 1994; Shweder & Haidt, 1993 ). There are cross-cultural differences in the conceptualization of wisdom, too. For example Takahashi and Overton (2005) have noted that the Eastern mode of wisdom stresses the integration of affect with cognition and a reflective conscious experience whereas the Western approach stresses cognitive capabilities and doesn't much differentiate wisdom from knowledge. Culture, thus, is a critical aspect of higher level human needs (for review, see Heine, 2007; Morling & Kitayama, 2007) .
But the influence of culture is not limited to higher order needs. All human needs are culturally malleable in their content, their strength, and in the ways they are satisfied. In other words, humans show very high levels of motivational
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Kesebir, Graham, and Oishi plasticity-a fact that the entire marketing industry depends upon. Even ''basic'' needs such as sleep, eating, and sex show variability in their expression, as is apparent in cross-cultural differences in where people sleep and with whom (Shweder, Balle-Jensen, & Goldstein, 1995) , what and how much people eat (Rozin, 1996) , and how sexual behavior is regulated (Baumeister & Twenge, 2002) . Social needs such as affiliation and belonging show a similar variability across cultures. Different conceptualizations of the self across cultures seem to shape social-motivational systems, as is apparent in crossculturally varying needs for self-enhancement (Heine & Hamamura, 2007) , motivation for internal consistency (Heine & Lehman, 1997; Suh, 2002) , need for personal control (Morling, Kitayama, & Miyamoto, 2002) , and motivation to pursue personal versus relationally given goals (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999) . All that variability certainly doesn't mean that human needs are infinitely malleable. Cultures that don't address basic aspects of the human motivational system get modified or die out, as exemplified by the extinction of many utopian experiments (Sosis, 2000) . Baumeister (2005) has noted that the stronger a biological need, the less modifiable it is by culture. Therefore, female sexuality and fatherhood show more variation across cultures than do male sexuality and motherhood (''erotic plasticity''; Baumeister, 2000) , presumably because males have stronger sexual motivation and females a stronger motivation to take care of their children. Culture thus sculpts the human motivational landscape within the parameters set by the human material.
An Evolutionary Perspective Is Not Necessarily at Odds With Uniquely Human Needs
Our emphasis on culture and uniquely human needs shouldn't be read as a negation of an evolutionary perspective. We do not doubt that a hierarchy of human needs should be informed and constrained by evolutionary theory, and we fully agree that ''no human need can be meaningfully separated from biology'' (Kenrick et al., p. 297 ). But we also think that postulating uniquely human needs is not at odds with an evolutionary perspective, if one takes the particularities of human evolution into account. Humans differ from other species in that culture has played a major role in their evolution (Richerson & Boyd, 2005) . Moreover, culture is critical in the formation of human phenotypes. These unique aspects of human evolution, we believe, offer great value in explaining the origins of higher level human needs.
Culture has profoundly shaped the evolution of human psychology by creating the environments that exert selection pressures on humans. Culture-gene coevolution refers to the process whereby cultural environments change fitness criteria for humans, leading to the selection of genes that are adapted better to those cultural environments, leading to further modification of the cultural environment and selection pressures, and so on in a feedback loop (Durham, 1991; Lumsden & Wilson, 1981; Richerson & Boyd, 2005) . This means that human needs have evolved in cultural environments. For example, the invention of fire may be responsible for the progressive reduction in the strength of human dentition, along with the availability of pounding, grinding, and milling tools (Brace, Rosenberg, & Hunt, 1987) . These cultural inventions reduced the necessary amount of chewing, and relaxed selection pressures for larger teeth, presumably leading to a change in human physiology. Similarly, domestication of cows led to the evolution of lactose tolerance in some human cultures, and evidence suggests that this change happened independently in multiple populations in the last 7,000 years (Tishkoff et al., 2007) . Culture, in other words, is a force of human evolution and culturedriven changes in the human genome that do not require millions of years, suggesting that many such changes may have become part of human biology in the last 20,000 years (also see Hawks, Wang, Cochran, Harpending, & Moyzis, 2007 , on the recent acceleration of human adaptive evolution).
Given that cultural environments have changed human physiology, they may also have given shape to human psychology. There are indeed various accounts of how culture-gene coevolutionary processes may have changed aspects of human psychology (e.g., Boehm, 1999; Bowles, Choi, & Hopfensitz, 2003; Henrich, 2004; Wilson, 2002) . The final word on the evolutionary origins of many human phenomena-such as language, culture, arts, religion, and morality-has not been written. We believe that a better understanding of the evolutionary origins of these human phenomena will give us a more solid basis for a theory of human motivation, and coevolutionary processes will be key to such an understanding. In the meantime, we don't see any good reason for dismissing higher order needs as by-products of adaptive processes or automatically subsuming them under one of the needs shared with some other mammals, such as status or belonging, as such a strategy would unnecessarily limit our vision.
Conclusion
Kenrick et al. make a compelling case for eliminating Maslow's self-actualization from the top of the pyramid and replacing it with three mating-related goals. This new hierarchy of needs has the added benefit of applying to most, if not all, mammals. The drawback, however, is that this hierarchy no longer uniquely captures human motivations, as well as the uniquely human malleability of the relative power of different needs at different times and places. We have tried to highlight this malleability by concentrating on the power of culture. An evolutionary perspective, we believe, is not at odds with a uniquely human theory of motivation, as humans are unique in the extent to which they are shaped by culture at the phylogenetic, ontogenetic, and the proximate levels. Culture-gene coevolution may be a more promising lead to a theory of human motivation, and to any other efforts to integrate evolutionary theorizing with social sciences, than an evolutionary Human Needs and Culture 317
perspective that focuses on commonalities with other mammals (for a similar view, see Gintis, 2002; Laland & Brown, 2002) .
